There is no discipline in the natural sciences or the humanities which can make progress without arranging the phenomena it studies into classes according to the characteristics they have in common. This is true oflinguistics as it is of botany and of physics and archaeology as of the biological sciences. In the course of his early studies of variation in living organisms Darwin recognized that there were greater similarities or homologies within certain species of animals than others. He concluded that these homologies had arisen historically as the result of common descent and he was led to pose deeper questions about the origin of species. The theory of evolution had its starting point in Darwin's attempts to grapple with the difficult problems of the classification of species in the early stages of his long voyage of discovery.
The disputes in relation to the classification of neurosis and psychosis in psychiatry are no less fierce than those that persist in the realm of the larger taxonomic problems of biology. Good classifications have repeatedly withstood the test of time because they have been found to represent the interrelationship of objects, beings or features in a manner that closely resembled their kinship in the real world. As they have also exerted a powerful influence on the direction taken by scientific enquiry and on the practical activities of all disciplines, it is understandable that disputes between rival taxonomists should have generated strong emotions.
The correct interpretation of findings recorded in relation to the various forms of anxiety and depressive illness is at the heart of the widely divergent views regarding the most valid and useful classification of 'neurosis'. At one extreme are those who conceive the various syndromes as distinct and discontinuous disorders likely to differ in their aetiological basis. DSM-IIP embodies a taxonomic model of this kind. However as 'neurosis' was thought to be imbued, in the judgment of the creators of DSM-III, with the doctrinaire and obscurantist influence of psychoanalysis the term was jettisoned. The various syndromes are retained mainly under the various subgroups of 'Affective' and 'Anxiety' disorder which are treated as sharply distinct categories'. At the other extreme are those who view the different neurotic syndromes as merging insensibly with each other and best conceived as lying on a continuum.
It is necessary to eliminate at the outset the confusion created by the frequent employment of the terms 'anxiety' and 'depression' as synonymous for 'anxiety neurosis' and 'depressive neurosis'. The emotions as such are certainly not sharply distinct in ordinary mental life. Normal persons respond with despondencyand pessimism to defeat and apprehension and anxiety in anticipation of ordeals. A change from one to the other may be manifest within short intervals in time. In pathological affective disorders not only is there a wide range of concomitant symptoms but the emotions show less qualitative variation. Depression or anxiety predominate over relatively long periods and alternate or vary little in response to changes in life situation. It is this feature that renders them maladaptive in contrast sharply with the congruent responses of normals which, as Darwin pointed out, promote adaptation and probably have survival value.
Recent evidence from a study of 420 psychiatric patients is consistent with a difference ofthis nature between normal and morbid states of emotiorr', Using a diagnostic checklist these investigators found that, as emotional disturbance increases there is a shift from isolated symptoms to clusters of symptoms and thence to emotional disorders. In parallel with this progression there is a steep decrease in the degree of overlap between depressive and anxiety symptoms. Hence whereas in normal subjects anxiety and depression may both occur within short time intervals such comorbidity is progressively diminished as emotional illness develops.
Three studies of classification of neurotic disorder In this paper an attempt will be made to summarize the results of three large scale enquiries into the classification of neurotic disorders. Taken together, the results serve to define the advantages and shortcomings of 'categorical' and 'continuous' or dimensional models.
The Newcastle-Cambridge enquiries
This comprised investigations into the phenomenology, personality setting and outcome of anxiety and depressive disorders in Newcastle and Cambridge. The first study was published in a series of papers in the 1970s. One hundred and forty-five patients were examined with the aid of a standardized interview and examination covering a wide range of clinical, biological, developmental and personality features. The application of multivariate statistical techniques to the observed phenomena yielded a bi-modal distribution, the two modes corresponding to the anxiety states and depressive disorders. The clinical data also showed the patients to be differentiated by a range of personality features 3 -5 • An independent follow-up investigation of the course and outcome of the original hypothetical groups showed that at each stage of the 4-year period of the study which therefore extended for some years after completion of the initial treatment a significantly higher proportion of the depressive than the anxious patients had improved or recovered. There had been little diagnostic cross-over in the main groups in the longitudinal studies. Anxiety phobic states manifested their initial form of neurosis in most cases of relapse and depressive states developed depressive and not anxiety or phobicdisorders. Psychometric investigations during and after illness undertaken with the MPI showed significant differences between anxiety and depressive groups".
Predictive indices derived from multiple regression techniques utilizing features present during illness, the antecedent life events and the personality and biographical data showed the items that had best forecast outcome in the anxiety states to be markedly different from those that predicted outcome in the depressives". The findings were inconsistent with a unitary concept of these disorders.
In the second investigation, 117 patients with depressive, anxiety and phobic neuroses were studied; those with endogenous depressions were excluded'-", Clinical features and scores obtained with the aid of a range of rating scales for anxiety and depression were submitted to multivariate statistical analyses. Both sets of the results confirmed in their essentials the findings in the first study supporting a distinction between depressive and anxiety syndromes with limited overlap.
A recent analysis of the biographical information and personality data that had been gathered but not utilized in the analysis of the findings in this study showed that it was possible with these data alone to achieve clear separation of the anxiety and depressive groups. Discrimination was sharper among women than among men and the items that served to separate the groups differed radically in the two sexes" suggesting that there might be important differences between men and women in the clinical profile both of depressive and anxiety disorders.
In the third investigation'v", clinical studies based on PSE items showed a relatively clear categorical distinction between anxiety states and depressive disorders which included the endogenous depression in this instance. A discriminant function analysis of the scores on the items of Cattell's 16PF scale and the Maudsley Personality Inventory recorded by patients after recovery from their illness showed that on the basis of personality measures alone it was possible to assign 84% of the patients wbo had initially received a diagnosis of anxiety disorder or depressive illness correctly to these same groups, with a low rate of misclassification.
But there are certain limitations to the categorical classifications derived from presenting clinical features to which the studies in these sections had been devoted. As the critics of DSM-III. the most sharply drawn and comprehensive of taxonomic systems in psychiatry, have pointed out some questions are left unanswered by orthodox categorical systems 12 • 13 • One important question was implicitly pinpointed in the study that developed predictive indices for anxiety and depressive states", For personality and developmental features, as also physical illness, ranked high among the items that predicted outcome in these disorders. Hence the role of personality and developmental data in diagnosis of patients with emotional disorder are left unanswered by purely categorical taxonomies. These issues are taken up in the final section.
The Australian enquiries into the 'general neurotic syndrome'
A large body of evidence has been recently adduced by a team of Australian investigators in support of the view that causation of the most common neurotic disorders is to be found in personality factors, these being largely rooted in genetic causes.
From estimates of the variation in symptoms of anxiety and depression in the population over a 12·month period Duncan-Jones'< concluded that shortterm factors explained 30% of variance (life events contributing only 5%). But indices of long-term vulnerability among which constitutional and personality factors loomed large were found to account for 70% of variance. Hereditary factors proved therefore to be the largest single contributor to the matrix of causal agents. Duncan-Jones et al. interpreted their findings as consistent with a 'general neurotic syndrome'. But their findings may have been influenced by the fact that their methods of assessment were confined to anxiety-depression scales which took no account of phobic, obsessional and other specific neurotic features or syndromes.
The GHQ.30 extensively used in these enquiries has been claimed, on the basis of findings in a large USA community sample (as also in a wide range of other population studies) to have shown anxiety states and depressive disorders to be indiviaible'". A recent principal components study in an English community sample of 6317 persons called this indivisibility of 'anxiety depression' in question. Anxiety symptoms and depressive ones were clearly and reliably separated in 10 subsamples each of 606 persons. Distinct anxiety and depressive factors were found in all subsamples as well as the whole sample and in each age and sex group!", The life-time history of 446 pairs of adult Australian twins revealed little concordance in respect of the specific emotional disorder presented by the index case; some discordant form of anxiety or depressive illness proved to be more common in most ofthe twin partners".
Using DSM-III criteria Andrews 18 investigated six neuroses, non-endogenous depression, the panic agoraphobic syndrome, social phobia. obsessivecompulsive disorder, general anxiety disorder and dysthymia to study the pattern of their comorbidity. Both in their 892 twin volunteers and a clinic sample of 165 patients initially presenting with agoraphobic s~mptoms, exploration of the previous psychiatric history showed those with any form of neurotic disorder to have had two or more forms of neurotic disorders. In the sample of agoraphobics the majority had had more than three. The results are similar to those~n a Cambridge samplel'' except for one significant dIfference. The conditions previously suffered in earlier life by the agoraphobic patients had been relatively circumscribed and non-disabling. With the onset of agoraphobia the life pattern of patients became severely constricted and the housebound state predominated in the clinical picture from the mid-twenties onwards. There was a variable and intermittent colouring of depressive symptoms.
The successes uniformly achieved by Andrews in his special treatment package comprising educational, behavioural and cognitive methods 20 ,21 in all the main forms of anxiety disorder including obsessivecompulsive and agoraphobic neurosis are of great interest. The treatment not only ameliorated symptoms but modified (it was claimed) basic personality traits as measured by neuroticism, locus of control and 'defence style'. But lasting remissions are difficult to achieve with therapies in current clinical practice and the results of follow-up investigations over several years will be needed to evaluate the claims made. The studies also deserve replication in other centres.
In a meta-analysis of the literature relating to the results of treatment in four types of neurosis 22 ,23 they found antidepressant and cognitive-behavioural treatments to have produced equivalent improvements in all conditions. In a one year follow-up investigation of treated patients, they found personality factors made the largest contribution to variance in outcome. They concluded that personality structure and its genetic and other causes are the main determinants of neurotic disorder and regard the various neurotic syndromes to be inconsistent and superficial manifestations of these constitutional factors, They have been led by their findings to advance the concept of a 'general neurotic syndrome'<'. The Australian multi-disciplinary enquiries have probably adduced the most powerful body of evidence extant in support of this concept.
Tyrer's classification
Peter Tyrer25regards the neurotic disorders as belonging to a single nosological entity, neurotics being distributed along a continuum with predominantly depressive symptoms at one extreme and anxiety symptoms at the other. The great majority of cases between them present with integrated syndromes with both anxiety and depressive symptoms. However a number of the six separate syndromes that are incorporated within this continuum are defined with the aid of diagnostic criteria that characterize them as distinct nosological entities.
At the depressive end of the spectrum the severe form is melancholia or 'psychotic' depression. This has been shown by a large body of phenomenological, pharmacological, genetic evidence and follow-up observations to be distinct from other forms of depressive illness. Thus the depressive phases of bipolar disorder are commonly 'psychotic' or endogenous and the recent observations which have mapped the gene for this condition to single gene loci leave little doubt about its biological specificity26,27.
The view that 'melancholia' is merely a severe form of 'dysthymia' or 'neurotic depression' is to divest 'neurosis' (a concept which Tyrer accepts as valid) of all meaning and 'psychosis' suffers the same fate in the process. 'Dysthymia', a distinct syndrome in DSM-III, is a chronic disorder and requires, as implicit in its description there, a personality diagnosis taken from Axis II to complete the picture.
In the mixed anxiety and depressive states in the centre there is again a severe form of the 'general neurotic syndrome' and a mild form: 'sub-clincial cothymia'. It is from community samples that the main observations validating 'anxiety depression' have been obtained. Tyrer argues that the two constituent emotional states may be so separated for a while but fail to retain their distinction for long.
The 'general neurotic syndrome' appears of central importance for the classification. It can be diagnosed only in the presence of a specific pre morbid personality
As there is no mention of any inclusion criterion in the form of personality diagnosis in relation to any of the other conditions defined, the 'general neurotic syndrome' is separated from the other five syndromes and accorded separate categorical status thus destroying the continuity of Tyrer's spectrum of neurotic disorders. The mild form of 'anxiety-depression' is described as subclinical. The inclusion of such a normal emotional state in a classification of neurotic illness requires justification.
Agoraphobia is described as the severe form of anxiety disorder at the anxiety pole of the distribution. Those suffering from this disorder have been reported to have a previous history of 'social phobia' in adolesence in about 40-50% of the cases'? and a variable colouring of depressive symptoms, often transient are common. Agoraphobic symptoms are averted or abolished by the presence of a spouse or friend. It is the housebound state and associated symptoms of panic attacks, perceptual distortion and feelings of unreality that constitute the surviving and often refractory core of the syndrome.
The validity of Torgersen's twin data 28 is called in question by Tyrer but there are also observations by Noyes et al. 29 and Leckman et al. 3o testifying to the specific familial aggregation of panic-agoraphobic disorders without any significant excess of general anxiety disorder which cannot be discounted. In addition there are the PET scan findings" and treatment response (to behavioural and cognitive as also physical methods), which are inconsistent with the view that the agoraphobic syndrome is merely an exaggerated version of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Perugi et al. 32 have drawn attention to the nebulous and unsatisfactory nature of the DSM-III definition of GAD. They conclude that '... GAD emerges as a lifelong trait, characterised by fluctuating and freefloating anxiety or a form of personality disorder'. There are therefore a number of findings that invalidate its position in the Tyrer spectrum where it is paired with agoraphobia as the mild form of anxiety disorder and by implication of agoraphobia.
Panic disorder, social phobic states and simple phobic states are omitted from the spectrum. So are depersonalization states and obsessive-compulsive neurosis. None of these conditions can be entirely dissociated from the anxiety disorders in particular. Circumscribed, intermittent agoraphobic and other phobic symptoms including panic attacks, doubt-laden fears of illness and isolated obsessional ideas are of value in discriminating anxiety disorders from depressive and other neuroses, without satisfying diagnostic criteria for the specific anxiety disorder with which they have one or two features in common.
Classification and the results of treatment
In the Nottingham study33 patients with generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder and dysthymia diagnosed by DSM-III criteria were each randomly allocated to treatment with an antidepressant drug (dothiepin), a benzodiazepine compound (diazepam) cognitive and behavioural therapy and a self-help treatment programme. All treatments were given for 6 weeks and withdrawn by 10 weeks. There were no significant differences in treatment response between the diagnostic groups and dothiepin, cognitive and behavioural treatment and self-help proved to be of similar efficacy. It did not appear at all certain that any of the active treatments had performed better than placebo. But the findings were judged to have provided no support for the differentiation of depressive from anxiety disorders.
The validity of this conclusion is open to question. GAD and dysthmyic disorder are weak and ambiguous clinical entities with considerable overlap in respect of anxiety and depressive symptoms and concomitant personality disorder. Inferences bearing on the classification of such disorders often chronic in course drawn from clinical trials of treatment over a 6-10 week period are of dubious validity. Further closely similar treatment responses by a number of syndromes do not warrant the conclusion that they are varying manifestations of some unitary nosological entity. Rheumatoid arthritis, asthma, systemic lupus erythematosis, nephrotic syndrome, cranial arteritis, collagen disorders and dermatoses are all favourably influenced by corticoids. But they do not thereby constitute a single class of disorders. On the other hand a qualitatively different response to a given treatment by two hypothetically distinct disorders has an unequivocal significance. If patients with one disorder recover or improve and in the other group there is no change or an exacerbation of symptoms the finding supports the hypothesis that they are separate entities provided that any confounding variables have been eliminated as a possible explanation of the result.
Comment
The creation of a unitary concept of neurotic disorders that incorporates all known syndromes and represents them along one (or more) continuous dimensions may prove possible when scientific studies have provided more biological and psychological evidence. Ifso it will not preempt or dispose of categories of neurosis but provide a complementary concept for characterizing them along the lines broadly adumbrated in the Neurotic Constitution of Slater3". For the present such an achievement appears beyond reach. This is exemplified by the outcome of Tyrer's bold attempt to create a unitary concept. He postulates a continuum with predominantly depressive states at one extreme and anxiety states at the other. But when it comes to detailed specification of the syndromes he is compelled to include three entities represented in DSM-III as categorical. Three ofthese, melancholia, agoraphobia and the third dysthymia are widely accepted as such. A fourth entity, the 'general neurotic syndrome', which is central to the whole scheme is characterized by both anxiety and depression. But it is converted into a category by stipulation of a personality diagnosis as an essential inclusion criterion unique for this syndrome. A fifth disorder described as 'normal anxiety with depression' is stated to bea sub-clinical disorder and is out of place in a classification of neurotic states.
Discussions and conclusions
That there are lines of continuity and areas of overlap between the different anxiety disorders and between all of them and depressive states is not in question. The categorical system places more weight on the discontinuities than on the continuities on the strength of the evidence that the former define syndromes which have in the past often promoted the development of new treatments, improved prediction and proved of heuristic value for scientific enquiry. The achievements of concepts such as the 'general neurotic syndrome' which assume continuity are not for the present in evidence.
Diagnoses such as agoraphobia and obsessive compulsive neurosis are good overall predictors of the course and outcome of the neurotic features they subsume. To some extent they are also successful in predicting response to a range of treatments and outcome in different environmental situations. However, the forecast of outcome in response to anyone specific treatment or situation has been repeatedly shown to be more accurate when undertaken with the aid of multiple regression techniques from a range of variables than from categorical diagnosis alone. The predictive indices created in this manner have drawn upon variables such as previous developmental and social history, occupational record and measures of personality6,35-37. But classifications cannot be built from such predictive indices on account of the fragility of the multiple regression equations from which they are derived. A different index and a different classification would need therefore to be developed for each form of treatment and each social and environmental setting.
Similarity of treatment response by different syndromes does not signify that they constitute a unitary nosological entity. The findings of Tyrer and Andrews have to be set alongside evidence that a number of neurotic disorders are characterized by specific responses to certain treatments. A substantial proportion of obsessive-compulsive disorders respond favourably to clomipramine or new 5HT reuptake inhibitors such as fluvoxamine's. Agoraphobia responds to behavioural and cognitive treatments but these treatments are without effect in severe depressive illness or generalized anxiety disorder. Alprazolam has been shown to alleviate panic-agoraphobic disorder including the prominent depressive symptoms often associated with it 39 ,40. Psychotic and endogenous depression fail to respond or get worse. However, severe depressions including exacerbations of dysthymia with suicidal risk respond to ECT. Administered to anxiety disorders this treatment causes an exacerbation of symptoms. In a whole range of clinical trials of depressive disorders in which predictive indices have been developed from multivariate techniques anxiety has proved to benegatively correlated with prognosis whereas typical depressive features showed a positive correlation'v". Anorexia nervosa responds to no known treatment though anxiety and/or depression are prominent. It is not implied that drugs suffice for the management of neurotic disorders.
Perhaps the most important body of evidence that has emerged in recent years is that which has defined the importance of personality (or 'vulnerability') factors and their genetic determinants as causes of neurotic disorders. However the conclusion of the Australian workers that the varying forms of neuroses arise from identical hereditary factors is premature, particularly as the hereditary factors responsible are almost certainly polygenic.
There is no solid evidence that the different anxiety syndromes develop within an identical personality setting. But the recent return to study of personality settings and their premorbid origins of neurotic disorders shows promise for resolving some important issues. In DSM-III Axis II is devoted to personality diagnosis but investigators who employ DSM-III have in the past mainly drawn upon cross-sectional Axis I diagnosis syndromes alone. This limitation is being remedied by recent enquiries"! and some interesting findings are already on record.
The indivisibility of neurosis and premorbid personality was taken for granted by classical writers such as Schneider and to some extent by Slater. And recent investigators have tried to delineate and classify neurotic disorders, their inter-relationships and their links with normal human behaviour with the aid of a small number of basic dimensions of human personality'". The success of such endeavours will have to be decided by the results of enquiries which are at present in their early stages. It is uncertain at present whether different anxiety and or neurotic disorders correlate with differences in personality profile as Slater believed or if they vary independently of each other. Such questions need to be resolved by empirical studies into the relationships between illness and personality setting. The impediments created by the poor reliability and validity of existing measures of personality will need to be remedied.
Progress in research into personality setting can be expected to refine the classification of the neurotic disorders. It is already clear that unitary neurotic syndromes cannot be validated from results with anxiety depression and kindred scales which relate to the presenting features of emotional disturbance alone particularly as they relate only to pure anxiety and depressive syndromes. There is a sufficient body of new data to make it clear that categorical syndrome diagnosis requires in research as in clinical practice the complement of a personality diagnosis established with the best available measures as well as systematic clinical assessmenr'", One consequence of recent developments will hopefully be the correction of the narrowness and imbalance implicit in classifications constructed from distinct clusters of symptoms alone on the one hand and unitary concepts made up from simple scales on the other. The new findings should direct more clinical and scientific attention to the developmental, historical and personality settings in which neurotic disorders arise. Contrary to the view implicit in some contemporary writings the symptoms in neurotic disorder are not the whole disease. The usefulness of a classification depends on its purpose. As psychiatry is primarily a clinical subject, it is from this view point that classification must mainly be judged. A good clinical classificationhas four components: (i) the identification of homogeneous populations, (ii) temporal consistency, at least in the short term, (iii) a useful aid in selecting treatment and (iv) accurate prediction of long-term outcome. The current classification of anxiety and depressive disorders, and to a lesser extent other neurotic disorders (Table 1) will be examined on all these points.
Homogeneous population On this criterion, the current classification appears to be reasonably successful. This is because it is based upon the most easily identifiable features of neurosis, the presenting symptoms. Thus, panic disorder is a condition characterized by acute rapidly developing episodes of anxiety encapsulated in the panic attack which shows excellent reliability-, generalized anxiety disorder is more persistent unfocused anxiety, depressive episodes are associated with lack of interest, depressed mood,feelings of hopelessness and guilt, and if such symptoms are mild but persistent, the diagnosis of dysthymic disorder is made. Similarly, phobic disorders are concerned with situational anxiety and obsessional ones with .Combination of American (DSM·III-R) and World Health Organization (lCD-IO) classifications repetitive thoughts and acts. Unfortunately, although these individual symptoms can be distinguished without difficulty, they are not separated from each other in clinical practice. The exceptions are phobic and obsessional disorders, which tend to dominate the picture because they lead to avoidant behaviour, and can be usefully separated as 'anxious avoidant disorders". Acute anxiety and depression, whereas they differ in description, are bosom friends and do not like being separated. Many attempts have been made to separate them, notably by statistical techniques such as discriminant function analysis and factor analysis, but these exercises do not separate. them in practice. As a monozygotic twin, I am aware that it is possible to identify discriminating features which separate me from my co-twinbut these features are minor compared with the many common elements we share and which cause us to be misidentified frequently.
There is so much overlap between the individual symptoms of anxiety and depression that it is extremely difficult to differentiate a primary diagnosis. For years diagnoses of these conditions have only survived by using a hierarchical system whereas depression takes universal precedence 0141-0768/90/ 100614-03/$02.00/0 © 1990 The Royal Society of Medicine
